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INTRODUCTION 
Beginning in the mid-1980s, an increased concern emerged among Western 
nations regarding the proliferation of chemical weapons. This interest was partially 
generated as the result of an intensified scramble by Third World nations to obtain 
chemical warfare agents in the aftermath of their successful use in the Iran-Iraq War. 
Such weapons can provide Third World nations with an enhanced military capabil-
ity which under certain circumstances will entail the capacity to inflict massive 
numbers of casualties. Western concern over the proliferation of chemical weapons 
was renewed as a result of Operation DESERT STORM when it was feared that the 
Iraqis would use their chemical warfare capability against the United Nations 
coalition forces and/or Israel.1 
The purpose of this article is to examine the Libyan effort to develop 
chemical weapons and then to consider what options such weapons will provide to 
Libya. A secondary purpose is to consider the possible motives for the Libyan 
interest in chemical weapons. In making such an assessment, it is important to 
consider that a fire of uncertain proportions swept Libya's key chemical warfare 
facility at Rabta in March 1990. While initial reports suggested that the fire severely 
damaged the factory, this was not the case. As will be pointed out later, the fire 
caused limited damage and was almost certainly a Libyan hoax. 
Before beginning this analysis, the sources and approaches to this subject 
will be outlined. The chemical warfare plant at Rabta was built clandestinely, and 
the Libyan government continues to deny that it is anything but a pharmaceutical 
plant. While this represents a problem for research, the Libyans do have several 
disadvantages that have made it extremely difficult to conceal their activities. The 
Libyans were not equipped to build such a factory themselves and therefore needed 
to import almost all of the components for the site. They also had to rely extensively 
on foreign experts to design the plant and make it operational. None of these factors 
are conducive to keeping the work at Rabta a secret. 
Additionally, the US government under Presidents Reagan and Bush chose 
to reveal a great deal of the information known to them about the plant. This was 
done for several reasons. One key reason was to convince US allies of the nature 
of the problem. The Germans (then West Germans) were particularly difficult to 
convince, though they did accept the US viewpoint after long and intense diplomatic 
and political coordination. Later, Germany itself issued a number of statements of 
public concern about the Libyan chemical capability.2 A second widely suspected 
reason why so much information was released involved the possibility that the US 
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was preparing domestic and international opinion for a possible military strike on 
this target or at least to convince the Libyans should the US leadership decide it was 
necessary to destroy the plant. 
In making their remarks, US presidents were relying on reports issued to 
them from the US intelligence community, which had been focusing its attention on 
the plant for some time. According to the US State Department, the plant had been 
identified by US intelligence sources in 1985 and was thereafter subjected to 
considerable scrutiny ? This meant that the Western intelligence community had 
a number of years to focus a variety of technical assets on the activities within the 
plant. The Western agencies may also have been able to develop human intelligence 
agents during this period as the plant had numerous European consultants visiting 
it and was partially staffed with semi-skilled laborers from Southeast Asia.4 
Even without human intelligence assets, it seems virtually inconceivable that 
the US intelligence community would not be able to ascertain whether or not 
chemical weapons were being produced at Rabta given the considerable time period ( 
that they had to make such an evaluation. Furthermore, US intelligence has in the 
past been required to monitor the activities of similar Soviet installations where it 
is assumed that security measures would be more elaborate and where technical 
systems must face a variety of atmospheric problems (e.g. frequent cloud cover) that 
would not be present with a target in the Libyan desert.5 
LIBYA AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS WITHIN 
THE MIDDLE EASTERN CONTEXT 
Libyan interest in the acquisition of chemical weapons is not an isolated 
event. It is instead one of the more worrisome aspects of the overall trend of 
chemical weapons acquisition throughout the Middle East. In order to understand 
Libyan interest in chemical weapons, it is useful to consider briefly how chemical 
arms have become an important factor in the Middle Eastern military equation. 
Chemical weapons use in the modern Middle East dates back to the 1960s, 
when Egyptian expeditionary troops used mustard gas and phosgene on the 
primitive tribesmen in what later became North Yemen.6 While these attacks 
initially appeared as an isolated set of events, some information exchange and 
probable chemical weapons transfers occurred between Egypt and at least one other 
Arab state (Syria) in the era following the 1962-67 Yemen War.7 In the aftermath 
of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War Syria embarked upon its own chemical weapons 
acquisition program, which had reached an advanced stage by the mid-1980s. This 
program included the construction of probable chemical weapons factories in the 
cities of Horns, Hama, and Damascus." 
Within the Middle East, however, it is clearly Iraq that has had the greatest 
impact on changing attitudes toward chemical warfare. Beginning in 1983, the 
Iraqis began to employ domestically-developed lethal chemicals against the Irani-
ans with some notable initial success in breaking up human wave attacks by Iranian 
infantry.9 Baghdad was later able to integrate chemical attacks into its offensive 
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military doctrine to help eject Iran from Iraqi territory."1 The Iraqis are also known 
to have used chemical weapons against its own Kurdish population in the 1980s and 
to have provoked the Iranians into developing their own chemical warfare produc-
tion facilities." 
After the Iran-Iraq War, Baghdad's leader, Saddam Hussein renewed his bid 
to claim Arab leadership. In doing so, he stressed his military power and the 
potential of Iraqi ballistic missiles should they be armed with chemical warheads. 
In April 1990, Saddam announced that Iraq had mounted binary nerve gas warheads 
on its extended-range SCUD missiles, and that he would use them to destroy half 
of Israel if Iraq were attacked by the Israelis.'2 These threats were later seen as empty 
during Operation DESERT STORM, when the Iraqis used only conventionally-
armed SCUDs to attack Israel. Prior to the war, however, Saddam's threats were 
popular in much of the Arab World and were seen as adding strength and dignity to 
the Arab response to Israeli military strength. 
In the unrestrained atmosphere of chemical weapons acquisition and use in 
the Middle East, the aspirations of Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi are therefore 
hardly an exception. Rather, Libya has sought to acquire a military asset that is 
already widespread throughout the region. This capability had proven useful 
militarily and had previously bolstered a rival Arab country's claims to regional 
leadership. Yet, while the Libyan program has undoubtedly been encouraged and 
accelerated by the Iraqi use of chemical weapons, this is not the origin of the Libyan 
interest. The former West German government has issued a white paper indicating 
that it was receiving intelligence reports about Libyan interest in producing 
chemical weapons as early as 1980. " Tripoli's interest correspondingly increased 
with Iraq's 1983-88 use of these weapons on the battlefield. It is also unlikely that 
Qadhafi would view the Iraqi chemical program as a positive factor in the absence 
of a similar Libyan effort. Qadhafi has traditionally disdained Saddam Hussein's 
claims to Arab leadership and even supported Iran during the Iran-Iraq War. 
The current Libyan chemical weapons effort centers around a large and 
modem production plant at Rabta, forty miles southwest of Tripoli. Construction 
of this facility appears to have been initiated in 1984, shortly after lethal chemicals 
were used in the Iran-Iraq War.14 Considerable assistance in building the Rabta 
complex was provided by European and Japanese firms. The German company 
Imhausen-Chemie played a central (if illegal), role in its construction, while other 
supplies may have come from Switzerland, Austria, and Hong Kong. '5 As of early 
1990, the Rabta facility was considered totally operational by the US and Germany, 
although uncertainties resulting from the March 1990 fire temporarily confused the 
issue of the plant's operational status. 
The potential for the Rabta plant to produce chemical weapons became a 
focus of intense controversy in the aftermath of a series of public US warnings to 
Libya. The first of these warnings occurred in December 1987 when the US State 
Department publicly expressed concern over the plant at Rabta. This process 
reached a high point when then President Ronald Reagan remarked in December 
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1988 that the US was considering using force to destroy the Libyan complex, a 
position that was supported by President-elect George Bush.16 Qadhafi responded 
by claiming that the factory was a pharmaceutical plant and had nothing to do with 
chemical weapons. 
Despite public concern expressed by the State Department as early as 1987, 
Libya does not appear to have responded to the possibility of increased scrutiny 
directed at the plant. No serious measures to conceal its nature were apparent except 
for the Libyan denials. Anti-aircraft protection, however, was provided for the 
complex, far exceeding that normally associated with economic targets, which are 
also protected in some instances. " These weapons were in place prior to the threats 
by President Reagan. In addition, CIA Director William Webster identified a 
facility for producing bomb casings directly next to the plant with the obvious 
implication that they could be filled with chemicals as part of the production 
process. This latter facility was built with the assistance of Japan Steel Works.I8 The 
desert location of both sites also seemed unusual for civilian activities. 
Finally, communications between the plant and other Libyan and non-
Libyan entities were apparently monitored by US assets. Open accounts of this 
activity suggest that key telephone discussions between Libyans and West Germans 
involved with the plant were intercepted. This compelling evidence of German 
commercial complicity later served as a partial basis for the arrest, guilty plea and 
conviction of the former director of the firm, Imhausen-Chemie." 
THE RABTA FIRE AND LIBYAN PRODUCTION CAPABILITIES 
The issue of Libyan chemical weapons production took a dramatic twist in 
March 1990, when a massive fire was reported to have severely damaged the Rabta 
plant. In describing the results of this fire, US officials initially estimated that the 
facility was damaged to the point that operations could not be resumed for at least 
one year. President Bush denied US involvement in setting the fire, although the 
media continued to speculate on the possibility of US, German or Israeli sabotage.20 
An alternative explanation was that the Libyans did not have the technical expertise 
to operate the plant safely without substantial foreign technical assistance, and that 
they therefore started the fire as the result of an accident. The key questions for US 
policy-makers remained who started the fire and what if any retaliation would the 
Libyans take? 
Yet, the story of the "massive" fire at Rabta seemed to unravel fairly quickly, 
and US officials were expressing doubt about the extent of the fire by late March. 
Also, on the basis of satellite imagery taken by the commercial French satellite 
system "Spot," the president ofthat corporation made an April 1990 speech stating 
that the fire was faked or exaggerated. Spot Image President Pierre Bescond said 
that analysis of the imagery taken of the plant revealed that the "black areas are 
mostly paint."21 The implication of this evidence was that the Libyans had started 
a controlled fire, exaggerated its consequences, and then painted portions of the 
Rabta facility in order to simulate fire damage for overhead photography. The 
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attempt would have to be considered fairly ineffective if it failed to deceive the Spot 
analysts. The capability of this commercial system is extremely limited when 
compared with advanced US reconnaissance systems specifically designed for 
intelligence purposes.22 
Also, while hardly depending upon the Spot satellite, US officials suggested 
that Bescond was correct. Detailed US photo-reconnaissance photographs would 
clearly reveal the existence of painted scorch marks with much greater clarity than 
the commercial system. Additionally, reports emerged of massive numbers of old 
tires that were apparently moved to the plant. These could have been used to 
produce a deception fire. On 18 June 1990, US Presidential spokesman, Marlin 
Fitzwater, referring to the issue of fire damage stated, "It now seems most likely that 
it was a hoax."2' By this time, the only conceivable scenarios that did not involve 
a deliberate fire would be ones in which the Libyans had a limited fire problem and 
then attempted to exaggerate its consequences. 
Yet, even if the fire did no damage whatsoever, the exact nature and scope 
of chemical weapons activities at the Rabta plant remain uncertain. Virtually all 
estimates of the plant's potential are quite staggering, and former CIA Director 
Webster has called the Libyan facility "the largest chemical plant that I know for 
chemical warfare."24 The New York Times suggested that the production capacity 
of this plant is between 10 and 40 tons of chemicals per month.25 It is also widely 
reported that one of the primary agents produced at Rabta is mustard gas. Other 
reports suggest that the plant can also produce sarin (GB) and/or tabun (G A), highly 
toxic nerve agents.26 
The descriptions of the Rabta plant as producing multiple types of chemical 
agents seem reasonable and appropriate to Libyan needs. Mustard gas retains its 
military utility despite its World War I origins. It has the capability to incapacitate 
or kill and is slow to break up under combat conditions. Sarin and tabun, on the other 
hand, are much more toxic but do not have the persistency of mustard agent. 
Persistent and non-persistent agents have different military applications so that their 
functions complement each other. Also, the Libyans may have initiated their 
chemical warfare production with mustard gas as a stepping stone to the production 
of the deadlier nerve agents. 
After the deception fire the activity at Rabta may have been slowed down or 
halted to add credibility to Tripoli's claims that massive damage had rendered the 
plant inoperable. Such a slowdown would reduce the profile of the plant in case US 
officials were again considering an attack. Surprisingly, Qadhafi announced the 
reopening of the "pharmaceutical plant" shortly after Operation DESERT STORM.27 
Qadhafi may have felt the distraction of the coalition withdrawal from Iraq would 
leave him more latitude to engage in controversial policies. This, of course, ignored 
the possibility that the US could have become more assertive against Arab radicals 
in the aftermath of the action against Iraq. 
Adding to concern about Rabta was a series of reports in the German and US 
media stating that the plant was expanding and that the Libyans were building a 
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second chemical weapons factory at a different location. The expansion of Rabta 
has been reported to involve as many as eight S-shaped concrete bunkers, which 
may be used for storage of chemical agents. There is also speculation that they could 
involve research on biological warfare weapons.28 While the validity of such 
speculation remains unproven, this interest would seem consistent with the Libya's 
interest in expanding its non-conventional war-fighting capabilities. Also, highly 
potent biological weapons, including anthrax, are not difficult to produce and may 
be within Libyan capabilities if resources were to be channeled in this direction. 
The second suspected chemical warfare plant is reported to be totally 
underground in a location several hundred miles south of Tripoli. It was reportedly 
first detected in May by the Israelis, who then provided their information to the CI A. 
When asked about a Washington Times story that initially raised this issue Fitzwater 
stated, "[T]here are a couple of places [in Libya] indicated as possible sites and they 
are being watched but nothing has panned out so far." On the same subject, he also 
said, "We are prepared to believe the worst."29 
Under the above circumstances, it seems likely that the Libyans have already 
obtained a significant chemical warfare production capability. It is doubtful that 
American efforts to impose a policy of tightened exports of chemical weapons-
relevant technology had any serious impact on the Libyan facilities' ability to 
produce lethal chemicals. Indeed, the US Administration's suggestion that the 
Rabta plant was in production in 1990 makes it likely that embargoes are too late. 
It is much easier to prevent the construction of such a plant through an embargo than 
it is to use an embargo to halt the operations of an already-completed factory. This 
condition suggests that US military threats against the Rabta facility may serve not 
so much to prevent production as to suggest that it may be in considerable danger 
should the Libyans actually start utilizing chemical weapons produced there. 
Perhaps responding to the fear of an American attack, the Libyans have been 
encouraging or possibly forcing civilians to settle around the Rabta plant.30 In this 
way, Qadhafi insures that any US attack will involve the negative publicity of 
significant civilian casualties. The possibility that other chemical weapons facili-
ties may be spread throughout the country would also support the Libyan effort to 
retain this option in the face of possible US military activity. Finally, the extensive 
production capacity of the Rabta plant suggests that canisters of lethal chemicals 
could be shipped from the plant and stockpiled throughout Libya. This would insure 
that a continued Libyan chemical warfare option was not dependent on the well-
being of Rabta or any other production facility. The Libyans would, however, have 
to be careful that their storage techniques were designed to encourage the maximum 
possible shelf-life for the chemicals which tend to deteriorate more quickly without 
careful attention to such matters as storage conditions and temperature. The less 
pure an agent, the greater the need for optimal storage conditions to preserve it. 
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CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND LIBYAN 
CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITIES 
In order to understand the potential utility of chemical weapons for Libya, 
consideration must be given to the overall missions of the Libyan military and the 
conditions under which Libya might call upon its military to conduct operations. It 
is also important to consider the importance of a strong military in Libya's attempts 
to deter potential attack as well as bolster the domestic legitimacy of the regime. 
Since Qadhafi came to power in 1969, he has shown a consistent interest in 
acquiring a large and modern army and air force. This led to an arms build-up that 
the Libyan leadership justified as a response to Israeli military superiority in the 
Middle East. Later, however, it became apparent that Libya also had a variety of 
additional missions for its military. These included a combat role in Africa — in 
practice focusing on Chad, but also Uganda in 1978 — and defense against Egypt 
with which Qadhafi maintained chronically bad relations from 1973 until a 1989 
reconciliation.31 Finally, Qadhafi believes himself to be an important leader capable 
of playing a regional role beyond that of leading Libya. He clearly views his 
aspirations to Arab leadership as being bolstered by the possession of a large and 
powerful military machine. 
Despite this abundant military arsenal, the Libyan military faces severe 
problems. Among the officer corps constant questions of military reliability and 
loyalty arise. Numerous coup attempts have been reported, and there is speculation 
that Qadhafi has been injured at least once by plotters.32 The need to subject the 
officer corps to continuing scrutiny as well as occasional purges is hardly a positive 
factor for the combat potential of any military organization. Equally serious are 
problems with the rank and file of the Libyan army. Because of the small manpower 
pool and the lack of technical skills among the Libyan population, a large and high-
quality military is not possible. Furthermore, Libyan troops have not appeared to 
be highly motivated in the past. During the 1987 fighting in Chad, for example, 
significant numbers of young conscripts surrendered to Chadian forces.33 Later, 
many of these troops made it clear that they had no desire to return to Libya. 
The culmination of Libya's military shortcomings are seen most clearly 
when examining its military performance in combat. Libya engaged in a number 
of military actions in the 1970s and 1980s, and in no case has the Libyan military 
performance been good. In July 1977, for example, Qadhafi's recurring problems 
with then Egyptian President Anwar Sadat erupted into a border clash. Against 
virtually no Egyptian losses, the Libyans lost between 10 and 20 Mirage aircraft, 30 
to 40 tanks as well as an unknown, but possibly substantial, number of infantry-
men.34 Within one year of this confrontation, the Libyans intervened in support of 
the Ugandan regime of Idi Amin, which was attempting to fend off a Tanzanian/ 
Ugandan exile invasion force. While casualties on both sides of this conflict were 




Both the response to the Egyptian attack and the actions in support of the 
Ugandan regime represent combat between conventional forces in which the 
Libyans did not fight well. In both cases the weaknesses of the Libyan military were 
underscored despite the possession of modern weapons. In the case of the attack by 
Egypt, the losses were incurred in an action that was never considered a full-scale 
invasion but rather a punitive raid aimed at punishing Qadhafi for anti-Egyptian 
policies in the Sudan. The full vulnerability of Libya must have loomed large at 
this time and the desire for some kind of non-conventional force equalizer could 
only increase. Furthermore, the Libyans, despite repeated efforts, had been 
unable to make much progress in obtaining nuclear weapons.16 Chemical 
weapons became a logical alternative, although Tripoli continued to seek nuclear 
technology from abroad." 
While the Egyptian and Ugandan conflicts underscored Libyan military 
weakness, continuing military problems in Chad were probably even more impor-
tant. Chad represents an area of fundamental interest to the Libyans. It is an area 
that they can use as a stepping stone for acts of intervention in Africa as well as a 
key staging point for enemies to threaten the Libyan regime. In this latter regard, 
a number of states, including France and the United States, have maintained warm 
relations with anti-Libyan forces in Chad. France has also stationed troops in Chad 
and provided logistical support for anti-Libyan forces in Chad. On a regional level, 
Egypt, Sudan, and especially Israel have at various times been interested in 
consolidating their relations with anti-Libyan groups in Chad to harass or destabilize 
the Qadhafi regime.,s 
While France is the most important external power currently involved with 
Chad, Israel is probably the Qadhafi regime's most committed enemy. In the early 
1980s, the Israelis even considered engaging in a massive effort to restructure the 
Chadian army along the lines of their efforts in Zaire. This option was rejected, 
however, on a cost-benefit basis by then Defense Minister Ariel Sharon. This 
decision did not rule out lower level support through the use of the Israeli 
intelligence service, Mossad, or the provision of captured PLO weapons to anti-
Libyan Chadians.19 It is also of interest that Israel's closest ally in Africa, Zaire, 
displayed a continuing interest in Chad and deployed troops there initially under 
Organization of African Unity (OAU) auspices. While the presence of Zairian 
troops in Chad outlasted the OAU mandate, the commitment was later to dissolve 
due to financial considerations.*' Nevertheless, the potential for Israel to escalate 
its involvement in Chad through direct action or surrogates is a matter of residual 
concern for the Libyans. 
The Libyan military record in Chad is one of missed opportunities and 
combat failures. Libya first intervened militarily in Chad in 1980. A second 
intervention in 1983 was met by fierce resistance from anti-Libyan factions led by 
Hassen Habre. This resistance has been characterized by one analyst as a "brilliant 
counteroffensive" which failed only because of the sustained application of Libyan 
airpower and artillery.41 The Libyans did not follow up even this limited victory, 
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however, because of an emergency deployment of French troops to Chad. Between 
1983 and 1987, the Libyan political position in Chad deteriorated, with factions 
previously friendly to Qadhafi rallying to his adversaries. 
In late 1986, Libya's attempts to consolidate control over northern Chad 
caused Tripoli's former allies to begin coordinating their military operations with 
Qadhafi's enemies. In response the Libyans increased their presence in northern 
Chad and mounted a massive air and ground offensive that led to the capture of four 
Chadian towns.42 By early 1987, however, the Chadians had turned things around. 
In March, the Libyan air base of Ouadi Doum was captured when its 5,000 defenders 
were overcome by a smaller and less well-armed Chadian force. Libya's army 
showed virtually no professionalism in this encounter, and panicked troops suffered 
high casualties running through their own minefields to escape the Chadians.43 
The Libyans were forced to evacuate their main base at Faya Largeau within 
days of the defeat at Ouadi Doum. The Libyan air force was then sent to bomb large 
numbers of vehicles and equipment left behind in order to deny them to the 
Chadians. The massive defeat totally demoralized the Libyan military, and a large 
number of pilots and officers defected to Egypt. A September 1987 cease-fire was 
put into place as a result of efforts by the OAU, leaving the Libyan position in Chad 
confined to the disputed Aouzou Strip. Later, in 1988, diplomatic relations were 
restored between Libya and Chad on terms that were not favorable to the Qadhafi 
government. This did not end tensions between the two governments.44 
It is likely the war in Chad that provides the most dramatic example of how 
conventional military shortcomings could have influenced the Libyan decision to 
seek and acquire chemical weapons. Indeed, there have been charges by the 
government of Chad that Libya had used chemical weapons against their soldiers 
in September 1987, when the Libyans were in the final phase of their defeat. 
According to these accounts, Libya acquired blister agents from Iran and tested 
them against Chadian soldiers. While some of the Chadians suffered skin burns, the 
chemicals were not used in sufficient quantity to be decisive, nor could they 
realistically be expected to reverse the Libyan defeat. The US, nevertheless, took 
the threat seriously enough to send 2,000 chemical protective masks to Chad.45 
The probable use of chemical weapons by Libya in Chad is logical from a 
military point of view. Prior to limited US assistance, Chadian troops were 
completely unprepared for this type of warfare. In the event of renewed hostilities, 
Chadian ability to cope with chemical weapons attack will depend upon the amount 
of aid that is provided to them from the US, France, and other Western nations. 
While the use of protective masks may be adequate for dealing with a mustard gas 
attack, anything short of anti-chemical suits would be inadequate for the Chadians 
should they be faced with a nerve gas attack. 
LIBYAN CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND LONG-RANGE STRIKES 
Another area of concern to the West involves Libyan capabilities and 
willingness to engage in long-range strikes against Israel or US and other military 
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targets in Europe. Libyan readiness to strike at both sets of targets has been 
suggested on several occasions, but would probably only occur in the most dire of 
confrontations. The threat is, however, sufficiently serious not to be ruled out and 
therefore deserves thoughtful consideration. This is particularly the case as the 
Libyans are seeking to expand the capabilities of the two possible delivery systems 
for a Libyan chemical attack against distant targets. These are long-range ballistic 
missiles and aircraft that can be refueled in the air. 
Currently, the Libyans possess several types of Soviet-designed missiles, the 
most important of which is the SCUD-B missile. In the aftermath of the April 1986 
US bombing of Libya, one of these missiles was fired at the US base on the island 
of Lampedusa, Italy. This missile either missed through technical shortcomings, 
Libyan ineptness or because Colonel Qadhafi wanted to show defiance without 
provoking a Western response.46 
Unmodified Soviet SCUD-B missiles have a range of 300 kilometers, 
placing only a limited number of targets at risk from these systems. There is, 
however, evidence that the Libyans may be able to acquire the technology to 
increase the range of their SCUDs by an unspecified number of kilometers. Such 
action was taken by Iraq prior to Operation DESERT STORM to increase dramati-
cally the ranges of their own systems. The Iraqis relied upon European and 
especially German scientists to help them, and Libya has been able to tap into this 
manpower pool as well.47 According to the Congressional testimony of former US 
Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci, Qadhafi has also been quite successful in 
acquiring the aid of German missile scientists.48 
The Libyans may also obtain support from other Third World countries with 
advancing military space industries to improve and diversify their missile holdings. 
The North Koreans, for example, have provided SCUD missiles to a variety of 
Middle Eastern clients in the past and are widely believed to have exported either 
SCUD or 1,000 kilometer range No Dong-1 missiles to Libya. Qadhafi has strongly 
denied that his country has these weapons, but he has also given speeches suggesting 
such missile acquisition would be useful and important for Triploi.49 Also, the 
Libyans have indicated an interest in Brazilian ballistic missile and space technol-
ogy.50 Finally, the sale by China of CSS-2 Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles 
(IRBMs) to Saudi Arabia produced Libyan interest in this system. These missiles 
have a range of 3,000 kilometers and would be exceptionally dangerous in Libyan 
hands. Fortunately, the Bush Administration seems to have obtained a specific 
Chinese promise not to sell more IRBMs in the Middle East. The sanctions imposed 
on China by President Clinton over Chinese sales of shorter range missiles to 
Pakistan also make it unlikely that Beijing will consider supplying any missiles to 
the Libyans. 
Apart from ballistic missiles, the other system that is most useful for long-
range strikes is bomber aircraft. Currently, some unrefueled Libyan bombers have 
sufficient range to strike a variety of targets, including Israel and US bases in 
Western Europe. Of particular importance for these missions are Soviet-made SU-
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24 "Fencer-D" aircraft sold to Libya in the late 1980s. The Fencer has a large 
conventional ordnance capacity, and estimates of its unrefueled combat radius are 
as high as 1,800 kilometers. In 1989, Soviet spokesman Gennady Gerasimov 
denied reports that the Libyans had received 15 of these aircraft, stating the number 
was "something like six, no more."51 Even with this smaller number, the Fencers 
could be devastating as a long-range strike weapon if they were armed with 
chemical munitions. In a near-term time frame their considerable payload would 
make them an asset in waging a limited war in areas such as Chad. 
Additionally, the Libyans have displayed a considerable interest in obtaining 
the technology for in-flight refueling of aircraft. In 1988, for example, it was 
disclosed that Libya was cooperating with West Germany to adapt C-130 Hercules 
transport planes and some fighters to take probe and drogue aerial refueling units.52 
This attempt seems to have been abandoned due to technical difficulties and the high 
level of training required for mid-air refueling operations. Later, in March 1980, 
however, the New York Times quoted Pentagon sources as stating that Libya had 
successfully tested a system for refueling fighter-bombers in flight.53 This 
capability would eliminate the need for the Fencers to fly at higher fuel efficient 
altitudes where they would be more detectable and vulnerable. Also, the smaller 
fighter-bombers in the Libyan air force could be placed in range of Israel by aerial 
refueling systems. 
The main deterrent to Libyan use of chemical weapons for long- range strikes 
is of course retaliation. Israel has made large-scale retaliation a central feature of 
its foreign policy regarding hostile attacks. This policy has also been strongly 
asserted with regard to chemical weapons and implicitly underscored with specific 
reference to Libya. In July 1987, the Israelis tested a new long-range missile system, 
the Jericho 2B, by firing it into the Mediterranean Sea north of Libya.54 This may 
well have been a signal to the Qadhafi regime. Additionally, a succession of Israeli 
Defence Ministers have promised multi-fold retaliation should Israel be attacked 
with chemical weapons. This is an exceptionally serious threat as Israel possesses 
both chemical and nuclear weapons, although the latter remain formally unde-
clared. Interestingly, the existence of such threats appear to have deterred the Iraqis 
from using chemical weapons against Israel when they struck that country with 
SCUDs during Operation DESERT STORM. 
Likewise, a Libyan willingness to strike Western bases in Europe would 
involve issues of penetrating US defenses and then dealing with a US response. This 
problem would virtually rule out a Libyan first strike. Qadhafi may, however, seek 
such a capability as a way of threatening the West with a response should they 
consider undertaking operations against Libya. 
LIBYAN CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND TERRORISM 
A final concern created by the Libyan acquisition of chemical weapons 
involves Qadhafi's potential role in transferring these weapons to allies and/or 
international terrorist groups. Concern about terrorists armed with chemical 
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weapons was especially intense during the last years of the Reagan Administration 
and served as the core of then Secretary of State George Shultz's keynote address 
in the January 1989 Paris Conference on chemical weapons.55 Since that time 
interest in this issue has waned. 
A concern implied in Shultz's statement is that the Libyans may supply 
chemical weapons to terrorists much as they have provided them with other highly 
provocative forms of support. In the past, for example, Qadhafi has supplied the 
Irish Republican Army with SA-7 shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles as well as 
several tons of the Czech-made plastic explosive Semtex.56 
Qadhafi is also associated with many of the most erratic fringe elements of 
the international terrorist movement, including Palestinian extremist Abu Nidal.57 
While the Libyans may be more circumspect with lethal chemicals than with other 
weapons, there are potential circumstances under which Tripoli might consider it 
advantageous to supply terrorists with lethal chemicals. Should Qadhafi find 
himself in an escalating crisis with the West, he might, like Saddam Hussein, 
threaten to unleash terrorists. Using chemical weapons to make the terrorist threat 
more formidable might be seen as enhancing his deterrent capability. 
CONCLUSION 
The options provided to Libya by the possession of chemical weapons have 
been sufficiently alluring to the Qadhafi regime to justify the risks that possessing 
such systems create. The Libyans perceive both defensive and offensive military 
advantages from these systems as well as prestige and recognition within the Arab 
world. These factors are major considerations in Libyan foreign policy, and the 
pursuit of such options may be seen as justifying such options. 
It also appears unlikely that the Libyans are approaching the end of their 
program to create weapons of mass destruction. The probable expansion of the 
Rabta facility, the existence of other potential sites for similar activity, the 
employment of European scientists on missile research, and continuing interest in 
biological and nuclear arms underscore an ongoing commitment to programs aimed 
at strengthening efforts to arm Libya with unconventional weapons. In this regard, 
the experience of handling, storing, and weaponizing chemicals could be of 
considerable value in preparing the way for a large-scale biological warfare 
program. Biological weapons would be even deadlier than nerve agents and are 
much more appropriately described as die "poor man's atomic bomb" than are 
chemical weapons. 
Ironically, the Rabta plant and other suspected chemical weapons sites may 
have become something of a hostage to responsible Libyan behavior within the 
international community. As Western concerns over Qadhafi's expanding pro-
grams multiply, Tripoli may become reluctant to provoke the West with terrorism, 
confrontations over the Gulf of Sidra or other factors providing excuses for a reprisal 
raid that would strike at Libya's chemical weapons infrastructure. This could, 
however, be a temporary phenomenon as Libyan capabilities grow and Libyan 
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assets are dispersed and hardened. Eventually, Qadhafi may feel secure in the 
knowledge that his weapons systems could not be destroyed in a clean surgical 
strike. In this regard, the experience of the US military's inability to destroy 
Iraqi SCUDs on the ground during Operation DESERT STORM may be seen as 
particularly instructive for the Libyans. Once chemicals could be weaponized 
on mobile missiles, they could remain a threat even after waves of Western 
bombing attacks. 
In summary, the Libyan chemical warfare effort is both dangerous in itself 
and as a stepping stone to other efforts regarding weapons of mass destruction. 
Steps need to be taken to work against this effort. New German laws as well as 
criminal prosecutions of individuals previously aiding Libya have been a useful first 
step in this direction. Further coordination and cooperation among responsible 
states must also go forward, particularly regarding the sale of relevant technology 
(often sold illegally) and the movement of foreign nationals to Libya with the 
purpose of selling weapons technology services to Tripoli. 
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